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The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA)1 guaran-
tees children who qualify as children with disabilities the right to 
receive a free appropriate public education (FAPE).2  There are 
many points at which parents and school districts may disagree re-
garding the provision of a FAPE, but as the U.S. Supreme Court has 
  
  * B.A., Nova Southeastern University; M.A., Florida Atlantic University; J.D., 
Nova Southeastern University.  The author practices law in Concord, New Hamp-
shire, focusing her practice on the representation of parents of children with dis-
abilities.  Thanks to Sarah Redfield for her never-ending encouragement. 
 1. The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 
(2006), was originally enacted as the Education for All Handicapped Children Act 
of 1975.  See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 179–80 (1982) (provid-
ing a detailed explanation of the history of educating children with disabilities).  
All references to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act and its predeces-
sor, the Education for All Handicapped Children Act, will be referred to as 
“IDEA.” 
 2. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (the purpose of IDEA is “to ensure that all chil-
dren with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education . . 
.”). 
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determined in Forest Grove School District v. T.A.,3 when parents 
and a school district disagree regarding whether children should be 
identified as children with disabilities, an appropriate remedy could 
be tuition reimbursement.4 
I. INTRODUCTION 
IDEA, as with many civil rights laws, was born from litigation.  
The framework for the legislation that would become IDEA can be 
found in two cases: Pennsylvania Ass’n for Retarded Children v. 
Pennsylvania (PARC)5 and Mills v. Board of Education.6  As legisla-
tive history shows, one of the reasons for the enactment of IDEA 
was judicial decisions finding that children with disabilities had a 
constitutional right to a public education.7  PARC and Mills gained 
the most focus as the consent decrees for each case formed the basis 
for the language of the statute.8 
PARC set the standard that children with mental retardation 
could benefit from education and training and therefore were entitled 
  
 3. 129 S. Ct. 2484 (2009). 
 4. Id. at 2495 (“A reading of the Act that left parents without an adequate rem-
edy when a school district unreasonably failed to identify a child with disabilities 
would not comport with Congress’ acknowledgment of the paramount importance 
of properly identifying each child eligible for services.”). 
 5. 334 F. Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971). 
 6. 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972). 
 7. See, e.g., NANCY LEE JONES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE INDIVIDUALS 
WITH DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT: CONGRESSIONAL INTENT (1995), available at 
http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs7997/m1/1/high_res_d/.  The main 
reasons for the enactment of IDEA were: 
(1) an increased awareness of the needs of children with disabilities, (2) 
judicial decisions that found constitutional requirements for the education 
of children with disabilities, (3) the inability of states and localities to 
fund education for children with disabilities, and (4) the theory that edu-
cating children with disabilities will result in these children becoming 
more productive members of society and thus lessening the burden on 
taxpayers to support nonproductive persons. 
Id. at 1–2. 
 8. Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Judiciary’s Now-Limited Role in Special Educa-
tion, in FROM SCHOOLHOUSE TO COURTHOUSE: THE JUDICIARY’S ROLE IN 
AMERICAN EDUCATION 121, 121 (Joshua M. Dunn & Martin R. West eds., 2009). 
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to a public education.9  In a subsequent case, the PARC court noted 
that there was a “colorable constitutional claim” when a child with 
disabilities was denied a public education.10  After PARC established 
public education as a constitutional right, the next major issue for 
courts to address was whether the denial of education was a denial of 
constitutional due process.  The Mills court found that excluding 
children with disabilities from education without a hearing or a re-
view of the decision was a denial of constitutional due process.11  In 
defense of the known denial of an education, the school district sim-
ply claimed that there was not enough money to provide educational 
services to children with disabilities.12  The Mills court stated: 
The defendants are required by the Constitution of the 
United States, the District of Columbia Code, and their own 
regulations to provide a publicly-supported education for 
these “exceptional” children.  Their failure to fulfill this clear 
duty to include and retain these children in the public school 
system, or otherwise provide them with publicly-supported 
education, and their failure to afford them due process hear-
ing and periodical review, cannot be excused by the claim 
that there are insufficient funds.13 
PARC and Mills are representative of the national movement that 
was underway during the early 1970s to establish that children with 
disabilities had a constitutional right to a public education, a move-
ment of forty-six cases in twenty-eight states brought in state and 
federal courts.14  Viewed in light of the national concern that all 
  
 9. PARC, 334 F. Supp. at 1259 (“Expert testimony in this action indicates that 
all mentally retarded persons are capable of benefiting from a program of educa-
tion and training . . . .”). 
 10. Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 283 
(E.D. Pa. 1972). 
 11. Mills, 348 F. Supp. at 871 (“Defendants have admitted in these proceedings 
that they are under an affirmative duty to provide plaintiffs and their class with 
publicly supported education suited to each child’s needs, including special educa-
tion and tuition grants, and also, a constitutionally adequate prior hearing and pe-
riodic review.”). 
 12. Id. at 876. 
 13. Id.; see also JONES, supra note 7, at 3–4 (discussing the Mills decision). 
 14. JONES, supra note 7, at 4 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-332, at 3 (1975)). 
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children had a right to a public education and the fact that children 
with disabilities excluded from public education were entitled to a 
hearing or review of the decision, there was a growing concern that 
the goal of requiring states to provide children with equal educa-
tional opportunity was unenforceable.15  How best could Congress 
induce states to follow the law?  Give the states money!  And so to 
entice states to fulfill the constitutional obligation of providing a 
public education to children with disabilities, IDEA offered funding 
to states; a civil rights issue thus became a Spending Clause issue by 
requiring any state that received federal funding under IDEA to pro-
vide a public education to a child with disabilities.16 
Without expressly defining what an appropriate education would 
be, Congress required any state educational agency receiving funds 
through IDEA to establish and maintain procedures to protect the 
right to a FAPE.17  Under IDEA, states are obligated to identify, lo-
cate, and evaluate all children with disabilities residing within the 
geographical boundaries of the school district18 and then provide a 
FAPE to all children with disabilities.19  As safeguards, the proce-
  
 15. Id. at 4–5 (citing S. REP. NO. 94-168, at 9 (1975), as reprinted in 1975 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1425, 1433). 
 16. See NANCY LEE JONES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., THE INDIVIDUALS WITH 
DISABILITIES EDUCATION ACT: SCHAFFER V. WEAST DETERMINES PARTY SEEKING 
RELIEF BEARS BURDEN OF PROOF 1 (2005), available at 
http://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metacrs8327/m1/1/high_res_d/ (“The In-
dividuals with Disabilities Education Act is both a grants statute and a civil rights 
statute.  It provides federal funding for the education of children with disabilities 
and requires, as a condition for the receipt of such funds, the provision of a free 
appropriate public education . . . .”). 
 17. As the Rowley Court determined, the statutory definition of what constitutes 
a FAPE is “cryptic.”  Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 188 (1982).  IDEA 
defines a FAPE as one which: 
(A) . . . [is] provided at public expense . . . ; (B) meet[s] the standards of 
the State educational agency; (C) include[s] an appropriate preschool, 
elementary school, or secondary school education in the State involved; 
and (D) [is] provided in conformity with the individualized education 
program . . . . 
20 U.S.C. § 1401(9) (2006). 
 18. The duty to identify, locate, and evaluate a child is referred to as Child Find.  
34 CFR § 300.111 (2009). 
 19. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(3)(A). 
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dures must give parents20 rights that include the right to review edu-
cational records, to obtain an independent educational evaluation at 
no cost to the parents, to receive prior written notice regarding 
changes to the child’s program that were either proposed or refused 
by the school district, to have the information regarding their child’s 
education presented in their native language, and to present any 
complaints regarding the FAPE to the school district.21  As part of 
the procedural safeguards, parents are entitled to a due process hear-
ing22 and to appeal the hearing decision,23 as well as rights during 
the hearing process, which include the right to have counsel, present 
evidence, and to receive a written copy of the proceedings.24  To 
ensure that a child continues to receive services, when a request for 
hearing is made, the last agreed-upon individualized education plan 
(“IEP”) and placement are implemented during the pendency of any 
administrative or judicial proceedings.25 
IDEA defines “child with a disability” not in medical terms, but 
as a child who had been evaluated in accordance with IDEA as hav-
ing “mental retardation, hearing impairments (including deafness), 
speech or language impairments, visual impairments (including 
blindness), serious emotional disturbance . . . , orthopedic impair-
ments, autism, traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, or 
specific learning disabilities; and who, by reason thereof, needs spe-
cial education and related services.”26 
Special education is defined by IDEA as “specially designed in-
struction, at no cost to parents, to meet the unique needs of a child 
with a disability, including instruction conducted in the classroom, in 
the home, in hospitals and institutions, and in other settings,” as well 
as physical education.27  For further clarification, “specially designed 
instruction” is defined by the regulations implementing IDEA as: 
  
 20. Although parents are afforded the rights under IDEA, states are allowed to 
establish rules that allow the transfer of rights from parents to children when the 
child reaches the age of majority under state law.  Id. § 1415(m). 
 21. Id. § 1415(b). 
 22. Id. § 1415(f). 
 23. Id. § 1415(g). 
 24. Id. § 1415(h)(1)–(3). 
 25. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(j). 
 26. Id. § 1401(3)(A). 
 27. Id. § 1401(29). 
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adapting, as appropriate to the needs of an eligible child . . . , 
the content, methodology, or delivery of instruction [t]o ad-
dress the unique needs of the child that result from the child’s 
disability; and [t]o ensure access of the child to the general 
curriculum, so that the child can meet the educational stan-
dards within the jurisdiction of the public agency that apply 
to all children.28 
II. THE STATUTE’S DUELING SECTIONS: § 1412(a)(10)(C) AND  
§ 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) 
As originally enacted, IDEA did not specifically address whether 
parents of a child with a disability could seek tuition reimbursement 
as a remedy for a school’s denial of a FAPE.  The U.S. Supreme 
Court ruled in School Committee v. Department of Education29 that § 
1415(i)(2)(C)30 of IDEA gave courts broad discretion to determine 
appropriate remedies when a school district had denied a child a 
FAPE and that tuition reimbursement would be an equitable rem-
edy.31  Tuition reimbursement was characterized not as an award of 
damages, but rather as a way of making sure that parents who are 
forced to take matters into their own hands are not without a rem-
edy.32  The Court was concerned that allowing only prospective in-
junctive relief would not be adequate as the administrative and judi-
cial review under IDEA was a ponderous process that could take 
years.33  Prospective injunctive relief might be appropriate if the re-
  
 28. 34 C.F.R. § 300.39(b)(3) (2009). 
 29. 471 U.S. 359 (1985). 
 30. When School Committee was decided in 1985, the broad remedy powers the 
Court referred to were in § 1415(e)(2).  When IDEA was amended in 1997, the 
section was renumbered to 1415(i)(2)(B).  See Individuals with Disabilities in 
Education Act Amendments of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-17, sec. 101, § 615(i)(2)(B), 
111 Stat. 37, 92.  In 2004, the section was renumbered to 1415(i)(2)(C).  See Indi-
viduals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-
446, sec. 101, § 1415(i)(2)(C), 118 Stat. 2647, 2724.  However, the text was un-
changed by these amendments.  For ease of reference, all references to the “broad 
remedy powers” will be to the current section number. 
 31. Sch. Comm., 471 U.S. at 369. 
 32. Id. at 370–71. 
 33. Id. at 370. 
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view process could be completed in a matter of weeks, but as noted 
in School Committee, the review process could span years.34  The 
Court reasoned that determining that only prospective injunctive 
relief was available would require parents who disagreed with an 
IEP to go along with the IEP to the detriment of their child.35  Al-
lowing tuition reimbursement as an equitable remedy under the 
broad powers of § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) was appropriate to give parents 
the option of providing an appropriate education to their child while 
the review process moved forward.36  The Court cautioned that the 
parents who availed themselves of this remedy did so at their own 
risk; if, after a review of the matter, a court found that the IEP of-
fered by the school district would have been appropriate, then the 
parents would not be entitled to tuition reimbursement.37  Any inter-
pretation contrary to the Court’s would essentially defeat the purpose 
of IDEA.38 
Eight years later, the Court again had the opportunity to interpret 
§ 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) in Florence County School District Four v. Car-
ter.39  Carter raised the issue of whether reimbursement could be 
granted when the private placement was not an approved special 
education placement.40  Reiterating that § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) gave 
courts broad powers to determine appropriate remedies, the Court 
found that parents could not be held to the same standard as school 
districts when choosing a private placement.41  It would be very dif-
ficult to hold parents to such a high standard when the information 
may not be readily available.42  And while the parents’ choice of 
private schools may be costly, a school district’s offer of an appro-
priate IEP and placement would shield the school district from tui-
tion reimbursement.43  The Court, following School Committee, de-
termined that it would go against the purposes of IDEA to not pro-
  
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 369. 
 37. Sch. Comm., 471 U.S. at 373–74. 
 38. Id. 
 39. 510 U.S. 7 (1993). 
 40. Id. at 13. 
 41. Id. at 14. 
 42. Id. at 14–15. 
 43. Id. at 15. 
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vide tuition reimbursement when parents place a child in an appro-
priate placement, even if the placement is not approved as a special 
education placement in the child’s home state.44  To further the pur-
poses of IDEA, tuition reimbursement was an appropriate remedy, 
but in determining the equitable relief, a court should consider all 
equitable factors, including the cost of the private placement.45 
IDEA was reauthorized in 1997 and amended to add language 
that allowed tuition reimbursement.46  Many believed that § 
1412(a)(10)(C) “explicitly allow[ed] both courts and hearing officers 
to award reimbursement for a unilateral placement at a private 
school if the school district failed to offer an appropriate program” 
and “establishe[d] conditions for reimbursement.”47 
The new language of § 1412(a)(10)(C), first and foremost, pro-
vided that a school district would not be responsible for tuition reim-
bursement when the school district had provided a FAPE.48  How-
ever, if a child who had previously received special education serv-
ices was enrolled in a private school without the consent of the 
school district, a court or hearing officer might require the school 
district to reimburse the parents if there were a finding that the 
school district had not made a FAPE available to the child in a 
timely manner.49  Furthermore, reimbursement may be reduced or 
denied if parents failed to give notice to the school district of the 
intent to place the child in a private school and ask for reimburse-
ment, the school district requested the opportunity to evaluate the 
child and parents refused that request, or there was a finding of un-
reasonableness.50 
The statute appeared to give very clear guidance: tuition reim-
bursement cases would now be analyzed under § 1412(a)(10)(C).  If 
parents enrolled a child who had received special education services 
  
 44. Id. at 13. 
 45. Florence County Sch. Dist. Four, 510 U.S. at 16. 
 46. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) (2006). 
 47. Gerald M. Zelin, Remedies and Defenses under the IDEA, in SPECIAL 
EDUCATION LAW AND PRACTICE: A MANUAL FOR THE SPECIAL EDUCATION 
PRACTITIONER 10:8 (Gary M. Ruesch ed., Supp. 2, 1999). 
 48. 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(i). 
 49. Id. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii). 
 50. Id. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii). 
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in a private school, a school district may have to reimburse the par-
ents, even if the parents did not provide the district with notice of the 
intent to hold the district responsible for the private placement.51  
But what if a child had not yet been identified?  What if a child had 
been identified but had never received services?  These questions 
were answered differently across the country. 
A. The First Circuit: Greenland School District v. Amy N.52 
In deciding Greenland, the court focused on the obligation a 
school district owed to a child placed in a private school when a 
FAPE was not at issue compared to a child who was placed in a pri-
vate school when a FAPE was at issue.53  The facts of Greenland 
were that the child had not been enrolled in a public school for about 
eight months when her parents initiated a request for an evaluation 
and special education.54  After going through the identification and 
development of IEP processes, the parents notified the district of the 
intent to hold the district responsible for the costs of the private 
school the child was attending and initiated a hearing for reimburse-
ment.55  The court held that § 1412(a)(10)(C) limited the circum-
stances in which parents who have unilaterally placed their child in a 
private school are entitled to reimbursement for that placement to 
those parents who had provided notice to the school district of the 
need for special education services before removing the child from 
public school.56  Under the facts of Greenland, parents who removed 
their child from school without giving notice to the school district of 
the need for special education were barred from tuition reimburse-
ment.57 
  
 51. Id.; see also Zelin, supra note 47, at 10:8 (noting that a “parent’s failure to 
consult with the IEP team before making a unilateral placement was an equitable,” 
not a decisive, factor). 
 52. 358 F.3d 150 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 53. Id. at 152. 
 54. Id. at 152–54. 
 55. Id. at 155. 
 56. Id. at 160. 
 57. Id. at 159–61. 
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B. The Second Circuit: Frank G. v. Board of Education58 and Board 
of Education v. Tom F. ex rel. Gilbert F.59 
In Frank G., the court held that the plain language of 20 U.S.C. § 
1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) did not require a child to have received special 
education and related services as a prerequisite to an award of tuition 
reimbursement.60  Additionally, the court held that even if § 
1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) did limit tuition reimbursement to the class of 
students who had previously received special education, § 
1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) was not the only section that allowed for reim-
bursement.61  Furthermore, the court held that § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) 
was not the principal section that addressed tuition reimbursement; 
in order to fully understand a court’s ability to award tuition reim-
bursement, § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) had to be considered.62  Because § 
1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) allowed a court or hearing officer to award any 
appropriate remedy, tuition reimbursement was not barred in cases 
where the child had not yet received special education.63  Relying 
heavily on the purpose of IDEA—to provide an appropriate educa-
tion to all children with disabilities—the court found it unreasonable 
to expect parents to enroll their child in a program that would be det-
rimental to the child’s health and education simply to preserve their 
rights to tuition reimbursement.64  Recognizing that it was at odds 
with Greenland, the court noted:!
Greenland’s discussion of 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(ii) 
arose from its perceived need to deal with the subsection 
immediately preceding it.  Again, this subsection, § 
1412(a)(10)(C)(i), says that a local education agency is not 
required to pay for the cost of education, including special 
education and related services, “if that agency made a free 
  
 58. 459 F.3d 356 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 59. No. 01 Civ. 6845(GBD), 2005 WL 22866 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2005), vacated 
and remanded, 193 F. App’x 26 (2d Cir. 2006), aff’d mem., 552 U.S. 1 (2007). 
 60. Frank G., 459 F.3d at 368. 
 61. Id. at 368–69. 
 62. Id. at 369. 
 63. Id. at 372–73 (interpreting the statute consistent with the Department of Edu-
cation’s Office of Special Education & Rehabilitative Services’ interpretation). 
 64. Id. at 372. 
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public education available to the child and the parents elected 
to place the child in such private school or facility.”  This 
language troubled the Greenland Court, because it implied 
that parents are entitled to reimbursement if a free appropri-
ate public education was not provided “where, as here [in 
Greenland], the local education agency was never informed 
while the child was in public school that the child might re-
quire special education services.”  This “seeming ambiguity,” 
according to Greenland, “disappears when considered in 
light of the section’s affirmative requirement that ‘the parents 
of a child with a disability, who previously received special 
education and related services under the authority of a public 
agency’ can receive reimbursement for their unilateral 
placement of the child in private school only ‘if [a] court or 
hearing officer finds that the agency had not made a free ap-
propriate public education available to the child in a timely 
manner prior to that enrollment.’”  Greenland continued as 
follows:  
“These threshold requirements are key to this 
case: tuition reimbursement is only available for chil-
dren who have previously received ‘special education 
and related services’ while in the public school sys-
tem (or perhaps those who at least timely requested 
such services while the child is in public school).  
There is no dispute that neither Katie’s parents nor 
anyone else requested an evaluation for Katie while 
she was at Greenland.  There is also no dispute that 
she was removed from Greenland for reasons having 
nothing to do with any issue about whether Katie was 
receiving [a free appropriate public education].”65 
In distinguishing Greenland, the court stated that it could allow tui-
tion reimbursement when parents timely request special education.66 
Having recently decided Frank G., the Second Circuit vacated 
and remanded the district court’s67 finding that receipt of special 
  
 65. Id. at 375 (alterations in original) (citations omitted). 
 66. Frank G., 459 F.3d at 376. 
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education was a prerequisite to an award of tuition reimbursement in 
Tom F.68  The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in Tom F. and, 
in a split decision, affirmed the Second Circuit’s decision to vacate 
the district court’s decision and remand the case for further proceed-
ings.69 
C. The Eleventh Circuit: M.M. v. School Board70 
In M.M., the Eleventh Circuit relied heavily on the apparent 
trend of holding a school district responsible for providing a child 
with a disability a FAPE and concluded that when a school district 
failed to do so, a child would not be required to spend even one day 
in an inappropriate placement in order to preserve the right to tuition 
reimbursement.71  Before reimbursement could be awarded, parents 
would have to prove that the school district denied a FAPE to a child 
with a disability.72 
III. FOREST GROVE SCHOOL DISTRICT V. T.A. 
At the time that T.A.’s parents filed a request for a hearing in 
2003, T.A. was a junior in high school.73  The record reflects that 
T.A. attended public school from kindergarten until the spring of his 
junior year, when his parents removed him from public school and 
placed him in a private school.74  T.A. had difficulty with his educa-
tion, including paying attention in class and requiring support at 
home to complete his schoolwork, but he never received special 
  
 67. Bd. of Educ. v. Tom F. ex rel. Gilbert F., No. 01 Civ. 6845, 2005 WL 22866, 
at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 4, 2005), vacated and remanded, 193 F. App’x 26 (2d Cir. 
2006), aff’d mem., 552 U.S. 1 (2007). 
 68. 193 F. App’x 26, 26 (2d Cir. 2006), aff’d mem., 552 U.S. 1 (2007). 
 69. Bd. of Educ. v. Tom F. ex rel. Gilbert F., 552 U.S. 1, 2 (2007). 
 70. 437 F.3d 1085 (11th Cir. 2006). 
 71. Id. at 1099. 
 72. Id. at 1099–1100. 
 73. Forest Grove Sch. Dist., 40 Individuals with Disabilities Educ. L. Rep. (LRP) 
190, at 764, 770 (Or. Dep’t of Educ. Jan. 26, 2004), rev’d, 640 F. Supp. 2d 1320 
(D. Or. 2005), rev’d, 523 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2008), aff’d, 129 S. Ct. 2484 (2009). 
 74. Id. at 765, 775–76. 
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education.75  T.A. was referred for special education evaluation in 
2001, and in a meeting without T.A.’s parents, Forest Grove High 
School staff considered the possibility that T.A. might have ADHD, 
but the staff ultimately decided to evaluate T.A. for a learning dis-
ability.76  The staff found T.A. not eligible for special education in 
2001,77 and he continued to have educational difficulties.78  In 2002, 
T.A. began using marijuana and exhibited noticeable personality 
changes.79  In 2003, T.A.’s parents had T.A. evaluated by a private 
psychologist.80  While awaiting the results from that evaluation, T.A. 
ran away from home, which resulted in a visit to the hospital emer-
gency room and enrollment in a short-term residential treatment pro-
gram to address the substance abuse and oppositional behavior.81  
The private psychologist diagnosed T.A. with ADHD, depression, a 
math disorder, and cannabis abuse, and recommended a residential 
setting to address T.A.’s academic and therapeutic needs.82  Those 
working with T.A. in the residential treatment program also recom-
mended a residential placement.83  T.A.’s parents enrolled him in 
Mount Bachelor Academy and he began attending the school in 
March 2003.84 
T.A.’s parents initiated a hearing in April 2003, requesting an 
order requiring the Forest Grove School District to evaluate T.A. in 
all areas of suspected disability.85  The school district conducted the 
evaluations in June 2003, and in July 2003, held a team meeting un-
der IDEA to determine whether T.A. was a child with a disability 
under the definition of the Act.86  Although all acknowledged that 
T.A. had depression and ADHD, as well as emotional and behavioral 
issues, the school district staff did not agree that those conditions 
  
 75. Id. at 765–68. 
 76. Id. at 766–67. 
 77. Id. at 768. 
 78. Id. at 769–71. 
 79. Forest Grove, 40 Individuals with Disabilities Educ. L. Rep. (LRP) at 771. 
 80. Id. at 774. 
 81. Id. at 771–72. 
 82. Id. at 774. 
 83. Id. at 775. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Forest Grove, 40 Individuals with Disabilities Educ. L. Rep. (LRP) at 778. 
 86. Id. at 778–79. 
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had an adverse impact on his educational performance, citing that 
the degree to which those conditions may be impacting his educa-
tional performance were not “severe” and “significant.”87  Further-
more, it was not uncommon for many students in the high school to 
fail one or more classes, so T.A.’s failures did not raise any red 
flags.88 
In September and October 2003, the hearing resumed and lasted 
six days.89  The hearing officer issued a final order finding, among 
other things, that T.A. met the criteria to be eligible for special edu-
cation under the identification of Other Health Impaired, that the 
district had failed to provide a FAPE to T.A., and that until the dis-
trict offered T.A. a FAPE, the school district is responsible for reim-
bursing his parents for their necessary expenses to send T.A. to 
Mount Bachelor Academy.90  The decision in part notes: 
[T.A.] was able to progress from grade to grade in the regular 
curriculum in his first five semesters at [Forest Grove High 
School] because his parents and sister provided him with 
what was in effect special education at home.  It is, however, 
the responsibility of the District and not the parents to pro-
vide a [free appropriate public education] for T.A.  Therefore 
the District is liable for the necessary costs of T.A.’s educa-
tion at Mt. Bachelor Academy—an appropriate placement—
until it offers T.A. at [sic] [free appropriate public education]. 
. . . 
The fact that it was T.A.’s escalating drug abuse, depres-
sion and out of control behavior that caused his parents to 
remove him (temporarily, they anticipated) from [Forest 
Grove High School] and the District does not diminish the 
legal significance of the District’s failure to offer T.A. a [free 
appropriate public education], or the legal right of T.A.’s 
parents to be reimbursed for providing him with an appropri-
ate education at Mt. Bachelor Academy.91 
  
 87. Id. at 780. 
 88. Id. at 779. 
 89. Id. at 764. 
 90. Id. at 784–85, 789. 
 91. Forest Grove, 40 Individuals with Disabilities L. Rep. (LRP) at 765. 
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The school district appealed the hearing officer’s decision to the 
U.S. District Court.92  The court’s understanding of the parties’ posi-
tions was: 
The District contends that 1) tuition reimbursement 
should be denied because T.A.’s parents unilaterally removed 
him from public school to a private placement without re-
questing special education services or providing any notice of 
their desire that the District pay for private placement; 2) the 
hearing officer erred in finding T.A. eligible for special edu-
cation services under IDEA; and 3) the hearing officer erred 
as a matter of law by making the District responsible for 
T.A.’s drug abuse treatment. 
T.A. contends that 1) the hearing officer correctly deter-
mined that the notice provision of the IDEA does not apply 
because he had not previously received special education and 
his parents have an equitable right to reimbursement; 2) the 
hearing officer correctly found that T.A. qualified for serv-
ices under the IDEA; and 3) the hearing officer correctly 
found that T.A.’s drug use did not make him ineligible for 
services under the IDEA.93 
The court accepted the facts of the case as determined by the 
hearing officer, but reviewed the legal conclusions.94  The court fo-
cused on the hearing testimony by the school district staff emphasiz-
ing that in order to identify a child with a disability, there must be a 
severe and significant impact on the child’s educational perform-
ance.95  Although the court did not rule that the hearing officer erred 
in determining that T.A. was a child with a disability, the court did 
state that any issues T.A. was having did not rise to the level of be-
ing so obvious to teachers that he required special education.96  The 
court stated: 
  
 92. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1320, 1321 (D. Or. 2005), 
rev’d, 523 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2008), aff’d, 129 S. Ct. 2484 (2009). 
 93. Id. at 1330. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 1327. 
 96. Id. at 1334. 
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Section 1412(a)(10)(C) was enacted subsequent to Flor-
ence and Burlington providing tuition reimbursement for a 
student who previously received special education services 
placed in private school without the consent of school author-
ities.  Even assuming that tuition reimbursement may be 
ordered in an extreme case for a student not receiving special 
education services, under general principles of equity where 
the need for special education was obvious to school 
authorities and the parents were uninformed or unable to re-
quest services, the facts in this case do not support such an 
exercise of equity.97 
In explaining why the facts of the case did not fit into the ex-
treme case scenario, the court found: 
The need for special education services was not so obvi-
ous in this case that the general exercise of equity would 
override the statutory requirement for tuition reimbursement.  
T.A.’s academic performance was not unlike many students 
at Forest Grove High School.  T.A.’s parents withdrew him 
from public school and enrolled him in a private residential 
school in order to address his drug use.  T.A.’s parents were 
informed of their rights under the IDEA and were able to re-
quest special education services prior to their unilateral deci-
sion to withdraw T.A. from public school.  Equitable consid-
erations would not support tuition reimbursement in this 
case.98 
The court reversed the hearing officer’s decision on May 11, 
2005, one year after T.A. graduated from Mount Bachelor Acad-
emy.99 
T.A. subsequently appealed the decision to the Ninth Circuit.100  
Although the lower court had not explicitly ruled that T.A. was a 
child with a disability as defined by IDEA, the Ninth Circuit did not 
  
 97. Id. (citing Greenland Sch. Dist. v. Amy N., 358 F.3d 150, 160 n.8 (1st Cir. 
2004)). 
 98. Forest Grove, 640 F. Supp. 2d at 1334–35. 
 99. Id. at 1320, 1328. 
100. Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 523 F.3d 1078, 1080 (9th Cir. 2008), aff’d, 
129 S. Ct. 2484 (2009). 
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decide the issue, as “[t]he Hearing Officer in this case held that T.A. 
qualified as disabled under the IDEA and that the School District 
had failed to offer him a free appropriate public education.”101  
Therefore, the issue of eligibility was not at issue for the Ninth Cir-
cuit.102 
Rather, the court determined whether tuition reimbursement was 
available to a child like T.A. who had never received special educa-
tion services.103  The court stated: 
In this case, the Hearing Officer and district court found, 
and neither party challenges, that T.A. never received special 
education and related services from a public agency.  Ac-
cordingly, we must decide whether the reference in § 
1412(a)(10)(C) to students “who previously received special 
education and related services” bars private school reim-
bursement for students who have not “previously received 
special education and related services,” or whether those stu-
dents remain eligible for private school reimbursement, as 
they were before 1997, under principles of equity pursuant to 
§ 1415(i)(2)(C).  In other words, did Congress revoke, cate-
gorically, private school reimbursement for students who 
have never received special education and related services 
from a public agency, or did Congress simply legislate con-
cerning students who had previously received special educa-
tion and related services, leaving discretion in cases such as 
T.A.’s in the hands of courts applying principles of equity?104 
In following Frank G., the court reasoned that 20 U.S.C. § 
1412(a)(10)(C) was ambiguous because it did not create a categori-
cal bar to reimbursement for a child who had never received special 
education, and a reading that created a categorical bar against reim-
bursement would go against the purposes of IDEA, leading to absurd 
results.105  Because the school district had never identified T.A. as a 
child with a disability, T.A. had never received special education, 
  
101. Id. at 1085. 
102. Id. 
103. Id. 
104. Id. at 1086. 
105. Id. (citing Frank G. v. Bd. of Educ., 459 F.3d 356, 370–72 (2d Cir. 2006)). 
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therefore § 1412(a)(10)(C) did not apply to this case.106  Whether 
T.A.’s parents were entitled to reimbursement would require an 
analysis under the general remedy powers found in 20 U.S.C. § 
1415(i)(2)(C).107  The court held that the lower court erred by con-
sidering the statutory requirements in the principles of equity analy-
sis; in particular, the court should not have measured whether the 
considerations in favor of granting reimbursement outweighed the 
statutory requirements, because the statutory requirements did not 
apply.108  Secondly, the court used the wrong legal standard when 
deciding that an order of tuition reimbursement is only available in 
“extreme case[s] for a student not receiving special education serv-
ices.”109 
The case was remanded to the district court with orders for re-
consideration of all factors to determine whether, and if so how 
much, reimbursement should be awarded.110  Such factors include 
notice to the district, “the existence of other, more suitable place-
ments, the effort expended by the parent[s] in securing alternative 
placements[,] and the general cooperative or uncooperative position 
of the school district.”111  The Ninth Circuit further advised that it 
would be in the district court’s discretion to consider all the reasons 
T.A.’s parents moved him to Mount Bachelor Academy in determin-
  
106. Forest Grove, 523 F.3d at 1087. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. at 1088. 
109. Id. (emphasis omitted).  The District Court relied heavily on the Greenland 
case in making the determination that even if reimbursement were available for 
children who had never received special education, it was only available in ex-
treme cases.  Id.  The Ninth Circuit, in this decision, explicitly rejected the Green-
land analysis in favor of the Frank G. analysis.  Id. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 1088–89 (alterations in original) (quoting W.G. v. Bd. of Trs., 960 F.2d 
1479, 1487 (9th Cir. 1992)).  In discussing how to consider notice, the Ninth Cir-
cuit recounted that although T.A.’s parents did not give the school district notice 
before they withdrew T.A. from school and enrolled him in Mount Bachelor 
Academy, his parents did request an evaluation and special education services for 
T.A.  Id. at 1089.  In balancing the equities, the lower court was directed to con-
sider the school district’s refusal to determine that T.A. was a child with a disabil-
ity and the district’s failure to offer T.A. a FAPE, as part of the notice determina-
tion.  Id. 
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ing whether an award of reimbursement was appropriate.112  The 
Ninth Circuit issued the decision on April 28, 2008, four years after 
T.A. graduated from Mount Bachelor Academy.113 
The school district then appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court to 
answer the specific question, “[w]hether the Individuals with Dis-
abilities Education Act permits a tuition reimbursement award 
against a school district and in favor of parents who unilaterally 
place their child in private school, where the child had not previously 
received special education and related services under the authority of 
a public agency.”114 
It appeared that the issue of whether T.A. was a child with a dis-
ability under IDEA was settled, and the only issue the school district 
continued to argue was that reimbursement was not allowed under 
IDEA because T.A. had never received special education and related 
services.115  In essence, the school district’s argument was that, as 
amended in 1997, IDEA permitted tuition reimbursement in cases 
where the public school district does not provide a FAPE to a 
disabled child, where the child’s parents enroll the child in 
private school without the district’s consent, and where the 
child previously received special education services from the 
district.  Even when those conditions are satisfied, Congress 
further provided that reimbursement “may be reduced or de-
nied” under certain circumstances.116 
The Ninth Circuit, the school district argued, did not acknowl-
edge that IDEA enactment was pursuant to the Spending Clause and 
that courts could only impose liability under IDEA if the statute un-
ambiguously imposed it.117 
  
112. Forest Grove, 523 F.3d at 1089. 
113. Id. at 1078, 1082. 
114. Brief of Petitioner at i, Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., 129 S. Ct. 2484 
(2009) (No. 08-305). 
115. See id. 
116. Id. at 6–7 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii)–(iv) (2006)). 
117. Id. at 14 (citing Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 
291 (2006)).  Recall the Ninth Circuit’s decision following Frank G. and finding 
that § 1412(a)(10)(C) was ambiguous regarding tuition reimbursement awards 
where a child had not received special education services but that the general rem-
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T.A. argued that not allowing reimbursement in cases such as his 
was in essence sending a clear message to school districts that they 
could deny the statutory obligations under Child Find, leaving par-
ents with only a court battle as a remedy.118 
Under petitioner’s theory, it does not matter how diligently 
and reasonably parents act in seeking services, or how egre-
giously school districts act in denying all special education 
services.  In all cases, the district’s violation of its statutory 
duties becomes the very source of its immunity from the 
statutory remedy of reimbursement, which this Court has re-
peatedly held is inherent in IDEA’s essential guarantee of a 
free appropriate public education.119 
In a 6-3 decision,120 the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the 1997 
amendments to IDEA specifically addressing tuition reimbursement, 
and § 1412(a)(10)(C) did not create a categorical bar on reimburse-
ment if a child had not previously received special education and 
related services.121  As the Court reasoned, because there were no 
changes made to § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii),122 reading IDEA as a whole, 
and in light of its purpose of providing a FAPE to all children with 
disabilities, § 1412(a)(10)(C) must be read as “elucidative rather 
than exhaustive.”123  In other words, § 1412(a)(10)(C)(i) is the gen-
eral rule that bars reimbursement only when a FAPE has been 
“available by correctly identifying a child as having a disability and 
proposing an IEP adequate to meet the child’s needs.”124  Clauses 
  
edy powers of § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii) would allow reimbursement so as to not contra-
dict the purposes of IDEA.  Forest Grove, 523 F.3d at 1086. 
118. See Brief of Respondent at 24–25, Forest Grove, 129 S. Ct. 2484 (No. 08-
305). 
119. Id. at 1. 
120. Forest Grove, 129 S. Ct. at 2487.  Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of 
the Court, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Brey-
er, and Alito.  Id.  Justice Souter filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Sca-
lia and Thomas.  Id. 
121. Id. at 2488. 
122. This section of IDEA went through renumbering, but the text of the provi-
sion remained the same as before the amendments.  Id. at 2490 n.5; see also supra 
Part II. 
123. Forest Grove, 129 S. Ct at 2492–93. 
124. Id. at 2493. 
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(ii)–(iv) elaborate “on the general rule that courts may” award reim-
bursement by listing factors that “may affect a reimbursement award 
in the common situation in which a school district has provided a 
child with some special education services and the child’s parents 
believe those services are inadequate.”125  The Court concluded that: 
The IDEA Amendments of 1997 did not modify the text 
of § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii), and we do not read § 1412(a)(10)(C) 
to alter that provision’s meaning.  Consistent with our deci-
sions in Burlington and Carter, we conclude that IDEA au-
thorizes reimbursement for the cost of private special-
education services when a school district fails to provide a 
FAPE and the private-school placement is appropriate, re-
gardless of whether the child previously received special 
education or related services through the public school. 
When a court or hearing officer concludes that a school 
district failed to provide a FAPE and the private placement 
was suitable, it must consider all relevant factors, including 
the notice provided by the parents and the school district’s 
opportunities for evaluating the child, in determining whether 
reimbursement for some or all of the cost of the child’s pri-
vate education is warranted.126 
The Court remanded the case back to the district court.127  On 
remand, the district court heard oral arguments and the parties sub-
mitted supplemental briefs to the court.128  Interestingly enough, the 
school district argued that T.A. was not a child with a disability, and 
therefore the Supreme Court’s decision should not apply to this 
case.129  In the alternative, the school district argued that the equita-
  
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 2496. 
127. Id.  The Supreme Court issued its decision on June 22, 2009, some six years 
after the initiation of a hearing on this matter and some five years after T.A. grad-
uated from Mount Bachelor Academy.  Id. at 2484, 2495. 
128. Minutes of Proceedings, Forest Grove Sch. Dist. v. T.A., No. CV 04-331-
MO, 2009 WL 4884465 (D. Or. Dec. 8, 2009). 
129. Plaintiff-Appellant Forest Grove School District’s Supplemental Response 
Brief on Remand at 1, Forest Grove, 2009 WL 4884465 (No. CV 04-331-MO). 
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ble factors did not justify an award for tuition reimbursement.130  
T.A. argued, now that the Supreme Court ruled that tuition reim-
bursement was a remedy available to T.A., that the court should take 
into consideration the district’s refusal to identify T.A. as a student 
with a disability, the length of the litigation, and the emotional and 
financial costs to T.A.’s family.131  Additionally, T.A. argued that 
the school district’s attempt to reopen T.A.’s determination of eligi-
bility showed how entrenched the school district was in not provid-
ing a FAPE to T.A.—the obstinate behavior should not be re-
warded.132 
On December 8, 2009 the district court issued an order denying 
T.A.’s request for reimbursement.133  The district court’s role, ac-
cording to the decision, was to weigh the equities to determine if 
reimbursement was appropriate.134  In weighing the equities, the dis-
trict court, following precedent set by previous decisions regarding 
T.A., considered all relevant factors, including: the notice given to 
school district; the existence of other, more suitable placements; the 
efforts expended by parents in securing alternative placements; the 
general cooperative (or uncooperative) position of the school district; 
and the reasons unrelated to the disability for securing the alternative 
placement.135  Although the district court weighed each factor sepa-
rately, the overriding factor in denying the request for reimburse-
ment was the reason T.A.’s parents enrolled him in the private 
school—specifically because of his drug use and inappropriate be-
havior.136  The district court determined that the obligation owed to 
T.A. under IDEA was “to remedy the learning related symptoms of a 
disability, not to treat the underlying disability, or to treat other, non-
learning related symptoms.”137  Because, according to the district 
court, the parents enrolled T.A. because of drug use—a medical is-
  
130. Id. at 9. 
131. Defendant-Appellee’s Supplemental Reply Brief at 2, 10, Forest Grove, 
2009 WL 4884465 (No. CV 04-331-MO). 
132. Id. at 20–21. 
133. Forest Grove, 2009 WL 4884465, at *4. 
134. Id. at *1. 
135. Id. at *2. 
136. Id. at *3. 
137. Id. at *4. 
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sue “unrelated to his difficulties focusing in school”—the school 
district was not required to reimburse the parents. 138 
Perhaps the most telling part of the decision was the discussion 
regarding the enormous costs to the school district if the parents 
were entitled to reimbursement.  Although not required in the analy-
sis—and technically not allowed139—the district court calculated the 
“potentially devastating real world implications” of requiring the 
school district to fund T.A.’s private placement by assuming that if 
T.A. required an out-of-district placement, then all other students 
with ADHD would require an out-of-district placement, thus requir-
ing the school district to spend 20 to 40 percent of the annual budget 
to educate 5 to 10 percent of the student population.140 
The battle is not over.  On January 7, 2010 T.A. filed a notice of 
appeal to the Ninth Circuit. 141  The issue raised on appeal is: 
Whether, in a case in which a school district failed to of-
fer any special education services under the IDEA to an eli-
gible student, the district court abused its discretion by fail-
ing to identify and apply the correct legal rule; by mischarac-
terizing the!record; by creating clearly erroneous facts with-
out any support in inferences that may be drawn from the 
facts in the record; and by resting its decision on illogical 
reasoning.142 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Forest Grove will likely have the most impact on children who 
are currently unidentified as a child with a disability.  Although the 
decision is just months old, it is already affecting determinations for 
tuition reimbursement.  In at least two cases so far, the courts have 
  
138. Id. 
139. “Of course, the IDEA makes no provision for taking into account the propor-
tional impact of this unfunded federal program.  Nor did the Ninth Circuit or the 
Supreme Court indicate that I should take this into account in my analysis and I 
have not done so.”  Forest Grove, 2009 WL 4884465, at *4. 
140. Id. 
141. See Notice of Appeal, Forest Grove Sch. Dist., 2009 WL 4884465 (No. CV 
04-331-MO). 
142. Id. at 4. 
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applied the analysis of Forest Grove to determine whether to award 
tuition reimbursement. 
In Anchorage School District,143 a hearing officer interpreted 
Forest Grove as going “to [great] lengths to explain that the right of 
reimbursement when [a] FAPE is at issue is a broad one.”144  In Re-
gional School District No. 9 Board of Education v. Mr. & Mrs. 
M.,145 the District Court of Connecticut cited Forest Grove as allow-
ing relief such as reimbursement when the school district failed to 
provide a FAPE and the private school’s education services for the 
child was appropriate under § 1415(i)(2)(C)(iii), but further ex-
plained that the award of reimbursement could be reduced or denied 
in accordance with § 1412(a)(10)(C)(iii).146  In T.M. v. San Fran-
cisco Unified School District,147 the district court determined that 
although Forest Grove “broadened the scope of Burlington, holding 
that parents could seek reimbursement even when the child had nev-
er received special-education services,” parents could “not seek gen-
eral money damages for emotional distress or intangible loss of 
educational opportunity” under IDEA.148  Finally, in Shipler v. Max-
well,149 the District Court of Maryland cited Greenland to argue that 
the procedural notice provision served the “important purpose of 
giving the school system an opportunity, before the child is re-
moved, to assemble a team, evaluate the child, devise an appropriate 
plan, and determine whether a free appropriate public education can 
be provided in the public schools.”150 
The enactment of IDEA occurred, in part, because parents were 
“forced to rely upon time-consuming judicial action to obtain a pub-
lic education for their children with disabilities.”151  While it may be 
little comfort to the parties of Forest Grove, litigation is not as 
  
143. 52 Individuals with Disabilities Educ. L. Rep. (LRP) 304 (Alaska Dep’t of 
Educ. & Early Dev. July 22, 2009). 
144. Id. at 1559. 
145. No. 3:07-CV-01484 (WWE), 2009 WL 2514064 (D. Conn. Aug. 7, 2009). 
146. Id. at *9. 
147. No. C 09–01463 CW, 2009 WL 2779341 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 1, 2009). 
148. Id. at *5. 
149. Civil No. JFM 08–2057, 2009 WL 2230026 (D. Md. July 23, 2009). 
150. Id. at *7 (quoting Greenland Sch. Dist. v. Amy N., 358 F.3d 150, 160 (1st 
Cir. 2004)). 
151. JONES, supra note 7, at 4. 
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commonplace as expected.  Studies have shown that the number of 
administrative hearings held in the United States are approximately 5 
per 10,000 special education students.152  Of the cases decided at the 
administrative level (approximately 3,000 and 5,500 per year),153 
only approximately 374 are appealed to a federal court.154  The 
transactional costs of judicial review can be massive;155 the annual 
expenditure for each open litigation case can amount to $94,600.156  
“Delay is endemic to litigation, and IDEA litigation is no exception.  
By the time the judicial process concludes, the record may be stale, 
and the decision may have little relevance for the child’s current 
situation.”157  While judicial review of a case may be an expensive 
exercise that in the end offers little to the individual child’s educa-
tion, there are indirect effects that shape the actions of educators, 
students, and parents.158 
The costs associated with litigation, rather than the concern that a 
school district is responsible for reimbursement, will likely cause 
school districts to review their Child Find procedures to ensure that 
all children suspected of having a disability receive an evaluation in 
a timely fashion.  This may require a renewed understanding of the 
criteria used to determine eligibility, and a better understanding that 
providing certain types of services to all children does not negate the 
  
152. Bagenstos, supra note 8, at 127 (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, 
GAO-03-897, SPECIAL EDUCATION: NUMBERS OF FORMAL DISPUTES ARE 
GENERALLY LOW AND STATES ARE USING MEDIATION AND OTHER STRATEGIES TO 
RESOLVE CONFLICTS (2003)).  The National Association of State Directors of 
Special Education study from 1996 to 2000 estimated that state agencies across the 
country held approximately five due process hearings for every 10,000 special-
education students.  Id.  The Consortium for Appropriate Dispute Resolution in 
Special Education found there are 7.9 due process hearings for every 10,000 stu-
dents, but the researchers conducting the study cautioned that mid-study changes 
in reporting may have skewed the numbers.  Id. 
153. Id. (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 152, at 13). 
154. Id. at 127–28. 
155. Id. at 128. 
156. Id. at 129 (citing JAY G. CHAMBERS ET AL., CTR. FOR SPECIAL EDUC. FIN., 
REPORT 4, WHAT ARE WE SPENDING ON PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS IN SPECIAL 
EDUCATION, 1999–2000?, at 5, 8 (2003)). 
157. Id. (citing Perry A. Zirkel, The Over-Legalization of Special Education, 195 
EDUC. L. REP. 35 (2005)). 
158. Bagenstos, supra note 8, at 122. 
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need for specialized instruction or the identification of a child under 
IDEA. 
By the time a final decision returns in Forest Grove, the Su-
preme Court’s decision may be a hollow victory for T.A. and his 
parents.  Although other school districts may be more aware of the 
signs of the possible need for special education and, even if based in 
a desire to avoid litigation, may be more willing to consider a child’s 
eligibility for special education, the facts of this case are that the 
school district continues to miss the forest for the trees.  The hearing 
officer’s decision ordered the school district to reimburse the parents 
until the district makes FAPE available.159  A less costly strategy to 
all would have been for the district to develop an appropriate IEP 
that would provide T.A. with educational benefit.  The moment the 
appropriate IEP was offered, the obligation to continue reimbursing 
the parents would end.  The entrenched stance that T.A. did not qual-
ify as a student with disabilities, likely based on a fear of opening 
the floodgates of litigation from other students in similar situations, 
will undoubtedly end up costing Forest Grove millions of dollars for 
one year’s worth of education, regardless of whether they are ever 
ordered to reimburse the parents. 
  
159. Forest Grove Sch. Dist., 40 Individuals with Disabilities Educ. L. Rep. (LRP) 
190, at 789 (Or. Dep’t of Educ. Jan. 26, 2004), rev’d, 640 F. Supp. 2d 1320 (D. 
Or. 2005), rev’d, 523 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2008), aff’d, 129 S. Ct. 2484 (2009). 
